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Chapter 8 
Serendipity as a Strategic Advantage? 
Nancy K. Napier and 
Quan Hoang Vuong 
Who, over the age of 20, hasn't experienced a serendipitous event: unex-
pected information that yields some unintended but potential value later 
on? Sitting next to a stranger on a plane who becomes a business partner? 
Stumbling onto an article in a journal or newspaper that helps tackle a 
nagging problem? Creating a new drug by accident? 
Serendipity, defined as the ability to recognize and leverage or create 
value from unexpected information, appears in all parts of life,1 and es-
pecially in professional fields, including science and technology,2 politics 
and economics,3 education administration,4 library and information sci-
ence,5 career choice and development,6 and entrepreneurship and man-
agement.7 Interestingly, although scientists have moved from reluctant to 
open acknowledgement that serendipity is behind many an invention or 
discovery, few business scholars or managers have systematically studied 
or applied serendipity in any direct fashion. The topic, though, may be 
gaining more visibility and attention: a new book on luck, for example, 
looks at how individuals and organizations have turned good or bad luck 
into something of value ("return on luck").8 
Thus, in this chapter, we seek to understand serendipity in a busi-
ness context, examine what it could mean for management and strategy, 
and how it could be used in business. We divided the chapter into three 
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sections. First, we examine the concept of serendipity and its importance 
and then review literature about it, in terms of definitions, conditions that 
encourage or hinder serendipity at different levels (the level of the indi-
vidual, the level of an organization, and external conditions), and the pro-
cess of serendipity. Next, we propose a tentative framework that seeks to 
incorporate the literature and existing models, and which draws upon dis-
cussions with executives who have begun to track and analyze how they 
might use serendipity in their ongoing management practices. Finally, we 
close with suggestions for how to develop the notion of serendipity as a 
competitive advantage, both in practice and in research. 
SERENDIPITY-WHYWORRY ABOUT IT? 
In the early 1950s, two eminent medical researchers-Drs. Lewis Thomas 
from New York University and Aaron Kellner from Cornell University-
separately noticed an unusual anomaly in their research labs: the ears of 
rabbits "flopped" when the animals received injections of the enzyme pa-
pain.9 Each researcher considered the phenomenon to be abnormal and 
dramatic, but for each of them at the time, not worth spending much en-
ergy on. They were both pursuing other research and this unexpected 
event did not peak their interests (or fit into their budgets) enough to fol-
low up. The same phenomenon consistently occurred on subsequent oc-
casions whenever they injected papain; again both researchers noticed it, 
but they did not pursue it. 
But some years later, in 1955, when Lewis was showing the phenom-
enon to a group of medical students, he finally decided to follow up on 
why the rabbits' ears flopped. At that time, he was able (more interest, 
time, and money) to pursue what had caused the odd result. When he 
at last studied what was happening, the pursuit resulted in research that 
was revolutionary, more significant than the research he had been pursu-
ing when he initially noticed the "floppy ears." The floppy-eared-rabbit 
research eventually led to a Nobel award. In contrast, the other researcher, 
Professor Kellner, never pursued the floppy-ears anomaly, as it did not fit 
into his research interest. Barber and Fox10 described what happened as 
"serendipity gained" (Thomas's decision to look into the phenomenon) 
and "serendipity lost" (Kellner's decision not to pursue it). The example 
offered a striking illustration of the potential benefit of investigating some 
unexpected information or discovery, as Thomas (finally) did.11 
More famous examples abound of unexpected scientific discoveries 
that have become lifesaving or revenue-generating products (e.g., peni-
cillin, Velcro). Interestingly, and perhaps because the results are easier to 
measure, scientists have unabashedly accepted the value of looking for the 
unexpected or anomaly that may be more interesting than the expected 
findings.12 In contrast, whereas most management scholars generally 
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ignore, at best, or scoff, at worst, the notion of serendipity as an ability to 
cultivate and use to organizational advantage, some management litera-
ture has begun to examine the concept. For instance, Brown13 argues that 
it could play a role in entrepreneurs' actions. Dew14 draws upon Saras-
vathy15 to argue that "surprises are usually relegated to error terms in 
formal models. Instead ... they may be the source of opportunity for value 
creation, but only if someone seizes upon them in an instrumental fashion 
and imaginatively combines them with ... inputs to create new possibili-
ties" (italics added). Interestingly, when questioned, many managers will 
say "it happens all the time," but are reluctant to admit basing major deci-
sions or directions upon serendipity. 
Yet, some business strategic moves may depend more on serendipity than 
managers or scholars have acknowledged in the past. Meyer and Skak16 
studied the decisions of small- and medium-sized enterprises that were con-
sidering and/ or moving into Eastern Europe. The networks that managers 
had developed sometimes offered "unanticipated opportunities by provid-
ing complementary resources, knowledge, or contacts." Given that the net-
works were outside of the firm's control, an important aspect was that the 
managers were open and ready to consider and then take advantage of the 
unexpected opportunities that arose. In particular, Meyer and Skak17 found 
that for small firms, such "elements of chance" could affect a firm's growth 
path and direction because of the networks, contacts, and opportunities that 
the managers could pursue as a result of those serendipitous events. When 
the small firms responded quickly, they could in some ways leverage such 
unexpected information better and faster than competitors. 
Finally, Collins and Hansen,18 in describing the idea of "return on luck," 
note that events-good and bad-happen in any organization. The ability 
to take advantage of them, to execute an action that generates good value, 
has benefited some firms in major ways.19,20 
As the management literature increasingly begins to open to the possi-
bility that serendipity may have value in business, perhaps the way Taleb21 
and others have discussed it in relation to scientists could be applied to 
management: "successful scientists search for something they know but 
generally find something unexpected."22 
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT SERENDIPITY? 
Serendipity as a concept has been around for hundreds of years. Seren-
dipity as a "studied" concept is rather recent. In this section, we review 
some of what has been examined and studied about several aspects of 
or affecting serendipity. First, we review definitions, characteristics and 
"types" of serendipity. Next, we look at the contextual factors influenc-
ing it, particularly at the organizational, individual, and external/ envi-
ronmental levels. Third, we examine literature that offers insight into how 
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serendipity happens, or the process that seems to occur once unexpected 
information appears. Finally, we review literature on the types of actions 
resulting from leverage serendipity. 
Most discussions on definitions of "serendipity" start with some ver-
sion of the story reported by Walpole (1754). Hundreds of years ago, a 
king named Giaffer educated his three sons to a level that nearly satisfied 
him, but felt they needed a bit more "seasoning" before assuming the du-
ties of the throne. He sent them into the countryside of what was then 
called Serendip, later Ceylon, now Sri Lanka. In the course of their walks, 
they noticed and made observations about information they had not 
sought or expected, ranging from grass eaten and not, spit wads on one 
side of the road, bees and flies, and footprints. When they arrived at one 
town, a farmer asked if they had seen his lost camel. 
"Is the camel blind in its right eye? Is it missing a tooth on the left side 
of its mouth? Is it lame in one leg? And is it carrying honey and sugar?" 
The astounded farmer at once accused the three princes of stealing his 
camel and demanded that the emperor punish them. But the wise em-
peror asked first to hear the princes' story. 
"We noticed along the way that the grass on the left side of the road 
had been eaten, while the right side was still covered with fresh grass (so 
we assume the camel is blind in one eye). We saw wads of grass that had 
dropped onto the ground, through a hole where a tooth should be in the 
camel's mouth. Bees like honey and flies like sugar, which the camel was 
carrying in packs on either side of its back and, as it swayed, must have 
left drops in the road. And finally, we noticed three footprints and a drag 
where a fourth would be, suggesting the camel was lame in one back leg." 
The princes' notoriety came from their ability to notice unexpected in-
formation that they were not searching for and, later, turn it into some-
thing of value. At the time, their curiosity caused them to notice, but 
lacking context, they did not connect the various pieces of information. 
Once they had a context for understanding the unexpected information 
and a problem (the lost camel), they were able to connect the pieces of a 
puzzle and offer and explain how they knew about the camel. 
Definitions 
The Walpole story is useful, but often not useful enough for people who 
have tried to define serendipity over the years. In the management litera-
ture that has tackled the concept, typical characteristics that emerge include: 
• Unsought, unexpected, unintentional, unanticipated event or infor-
mation,23 
• Out of the ordinary, surprising, anomalous, inconsistent with exist-
ing thought, findings or theory, 24 and 
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• An alertness or capability to notice what others do not, to recognize, 
to consider, and to connect previously disparate or discreet pieces of 
information25 to solve a problem or find an opportunity. 
Unsought, Unexpeaed .. . Anomalous and Inconsistent with Existing Thought 
The definitions range from being quite broad-unsought discoveries, 
unexpected events, or information-to being more specific and narrower 
in the nature of the event or information. In particular, the literature makes 
it clear that the unexpected information should be an "anomalous," incon-
gruous, or inconsistent discovery or finding, at odds with existing theory 
or ways of thinking.26 Scientists, especially, appear to conscientiously seek 
the inconsistent or anomalous information or event because that forces re-
view of existing theory and can, perhaps, lead to new directions with pos-
sible major payoffs.27 
In some cases, an individual may be searching for a new idea, problem, 
solution, or opportunity. In combinatorial chemistry, for instance, which 
often yields new drugs, the notion of "a blind search" is part of the pro-
cess,28 with "serendipity mistakes" just a likely stage in the experiment. 
Going down a blind alley in search of some answer but finding another 
one, then, is almost built into the research process itself. 
Dew29 describes serendipity as the intersection of three "domains" or 
elements: search, knowledge/preparation, and chance. He claims that an 
individual needs to be looking for something, such as a solution to a prob-
lem or an opportunity. She needs to approach the search with existing 
knowledge and preparation so that she will be able to recognize an event 
or information. In addition, the unexpected event or information has to 
emerge by chance. Thus, according to Dew,30 serendipity occurs only 
when all three elements are present and overlap (a search, prior knowl-
edge, and chance event). 
Yet, if we return to the three princes of Serendip story (or to the 
floppy-eared-rabbit story, for that matter), perhaps the search can come 
"after" the information appears. In their case, it seems that two of Dew's31 
three conditions existed on the part of the princes-prior knowledge and 
preparation and the chance occurrence of unexpected information (e.g., 
the grass eaten on one side of the road, the footprints, and rut in the sand). 
The princes-and often scientists-were not "looking for something," but 
rather were able to solve a problem once they were presented with it, not 
because they were seeking information to solve it. 
An Alertness or Capability 
Finally, a group of researchers note that the ability to notice or be 
aware of unexpected information is critical. De Rond32 talks of scientific 
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discovery as beginning with the "awareness of anomaly and unsought 
factors." Van Andel33 defines serendipity as the experience of observing 
an unanticipated, anomalous, and strategic piece of data, which then al-
lows for developing new theories or expanding existing ones. 
Other definitions focus on the capacity or ability to see and leverage un-
sought information or discovery. In other words, serendipity is not just the 
unexpected information or event but rather the ability to recognize and do 
something with it. Specifically, it is an individual's or organization's abil-
ity to recognize and capitalize upon an unexpected event or information 
and tum it into something that adds value for the organization-or, in the 
case of scientists, the research community.34 
Characteristics and "Types" 
For scholars, scientists, and practicing managers, serendipity can 
appear in several "types," depending partly upon whether there is a 
search "intent" and whether the unexpected information solves some 
problem or opens the door to new problems/ opportunities. In particu-
lar, several researchers use a 2 by 2 matrix to clarify these options. Es-
sentially, they break serendipity into two categories: (1) whether there is 
explicit intent to find something or a search exists to solve a problem or 
find an opportunity,35 and (2) whether unexpected information solves 
an existing problem or reveals solutions to unknown problems or op-
portunities.36 (Note: A situation where there is an intent and a solution 
to the problem at hand is a traditional problem-solving (A to B) situa-
tion, not serendipity.) Thus, this generates three types of serendipity, il-
lustrated in Figure 8.1. 
Type I 
First, the most common type of serendipity is when an individual seeks 
a solution to problem A and it does not come from "expected" sources, but 
rather from an unexpected event or piece of information, (B). For instance, 
when researchers sought an explanation for obesity, initial assumptions 
were that physiological or economic reasons were base causes; individu-
als had genetic tendencies toward obesity or they purchased cheaper food, 
which tended to be higher in fat content. In fact, two researchers study-
ing data from a small town in Massachusetts found another unexpected 
explanation, from a completely different direction. Put simply, they found 
that "your friends can affect your health." People who are overweight 
tend to associate with others who are overweight, as do smokers with 
other smokers. Christakis and Fowler37 argue that social networks and 
friendships may influence health, which was a completely unexpected ex-
planation or solution to the initial problem of obesity. 
Figure 8.1 
Types of Serendipity 
A~B 
(or B just turns up) 
A~A 
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Look for solution to A, but B 
"falls out," and solves C 
A-c A 
s~c 
Want to solve A and solution 
is expected logical result. 
Normal problem 
solving: 
A----,- A 
Looking for solution/ 
intentional search 
Not looking for anything, B 
appears and ends up as idea, 
opportunity or solution C, D ... 
B ------•- C, D 
Want to solve A, but solution 
comes from unexpected B 
A ------• A 
/ 
B 
Not looking/not 
intentional 
Note. Modified from M. De Rond, 2005, "The Structure of Serendipity;' Cambridge Judge Business School Work-
ing Paper. 
Type II 
Type II serendipity happens when an individual searches for a solution 
to problem A, but rather than finding a solution to A, uncovers something 
unexpected and unsought (B). Well-known examples of Type II serendip-
ity include the floppy-eared rabbits we mentioned previously, as well as 
penicillin and Post-It notes. Fleming was not looking for penicillin, but 
accidently discovered a "mold" in his lab that of course had many impli-
cations and uses. For Post-It notes, a 3M researcher was trying to create a 
glue that would stick well and instead, accidentally discovered one that 
did not stick so well, but then uncovered many uses for the newly discov-
ered product. 
Type Ill 
The story of the three princes of Serendip reflects a final and, as some 
might say, the truest form of serendipity. This occurs when a chance or 
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unexpected event or piece of information appears, and an individual then 
begins to think about what it might mean, and along the way, solves a 
problem or discovers a new opportunity he or she had not intended or 
thought of previously. In this case, no intent or overt searching happens, 
but to gain the benefits of the unexpected event, the individual must still 
have knowledge and a prepared mind to notice and then realize its po-
tential value. The legend of the apple falling on Newton's head-com-
bined with his knowledge of science-led to his serendipitous discovery 
of gravity's properties. Likewise, the also now famous story of the inven-
tion of Velcro: a man who found insistently sticky burrs on his dog was led 
to wonder whether there might be anything of value that could be made 
from such an unexpected bit of information. 
In Type III serendipity, some scholars insist that there must also be a 
"metaphorical leap" to uncover a possible value or use in the information 
or event. In Newton's case, a falling apple came to represent gravity's pull 
on any object; the "burrs on the dog" could be extrapolated to "some sort 
of material that holds tight." 
CONTEXT FOR SERENDIPITY 
It is not just the merit of the discovery that counts per se but 
also the context in which it emerges.38 
If a tree falls in the forest and no one hears it, does it make a sound? If 
an unexpected and unsought event happens and no one notices, did it re-
ally happen? Context is critical for serendipity. In the floppy-eared-rabbit 
example, one scientist did not and one (finally) did pursue an unexpected 
observation, yielding major research implications for the one who did. 
The key is that both researchers noticed the unusual event. Thus, for unex-
pected information to be of any potential value, it has to be noticed. 
The scholarly literature suggests that two factors influence the possibil-
ity of unexpected information being noticed and leveraged. Those factors 
exist at two levels: the organization and the individual. Most literature 
relating to organizational context refers to how culture can enhance (or 
hinder) the chances of serendipity occurring. At the individual level, the 
literature discusses characteristics and traits that individuals need to have 
or acquire to take advantage of serendipity. We briefly review each of the 
context factors further on. 
Enhancing Organizational Serendipity 
By far, the most important aspect at the organizational level for enhanc-
ing the chance that serendipity will be leveraged is organizational cul-
ture.39 At least four elements of culture emerge often as being important 
for increasing and facilitating serendipity.40 
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First, the notion of finding ways to help dissimilar individuals inter-
act with one another is critical, especially when they come from differ-
ent disciplines.41 As the book The Power of Pull suggests, if knowledge is 
dispersed,42 it is harder to find desired information with a formal search; 
rather, it is more likely that individuals will "discover something useful 
through a chance encounter." That requires infrastructure-both physical 
but also cultural-to encourage those encounters. Cunha et al.43 talk of the 
need for "free flow of information" through different types of social net-
works, such as when smokers meet outside a building. (One must wonder, 
as smoking disappears, what interesting ideas and social networks have 
also disappeared). When people come from diverse units and hierarchi-
cal levels, the opportunities for exploring the "periphery" of some field 
or discipline can grow, and that unexpected information and chance for 
exchange is high. 
Following closely along with the importance of diverse groups that 
interact is the need for trust, willingness to share knowledge, and so-
cial capital within an organization.44 In a culture that allows risk taking, 
withholding of blame, and openness to a range of ideas, the likelihood 
is greater that serendipitous events will be noticed and considered. Only 
then can they be leveraged or used to an advantage. If a culture thwarts 
open discussion or some amount of /1 directionless activity,"45 the chance 
for gaining value from serendipity disappears. 
Third, in addition to encouraging opportunities for cross-discipline ex-
changes and trust to happen, the literature suggests that an organizational 
culture needs to tolerate a degree of autonomy for experiments,46 "con-
trolled sloppiness,"47 and minimal structure.48 When some amount of in-
efficiency, dissent, and failure are allowed to occur, unintentional events 
may happen, which may in turn generate ideas, opportunities, or solu-
tions to problems. 
Fourth, for members of an organization to actively look for serendipity 
in their fields, it has to be perceived as relevant and important for that orga-
nization.49 The value of noticing unexpected information needs to be built 
into the institutional routine, and then, when some information has been 
recognized, it needs to be leveraged and implemented. As that cycle occurs 
and individuals see the results, the notion of serendipity gains credibility 
and legitimacy. That allows the organization to focus on hiring or devel-
oping people with a "serendipity disposition," with diverse search styles 
(looking for unexpected events), peripheral vision, and "weirdness."50 
Obstructing Organizational Serendipity 
The factors within organizations that encourage serendipity can, of 
course, hinder its likelihood if they are lacking.51 Without openness and 
trust, the chance of self-censorship increases and individuals will be less 
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alert to unexpected information. If power comes into play in deciding 
who "owns" a great idea, or if vested interests dominate within an orga-
nization, ideas or observations could be "interrupted" or quashed some-
where in the organizational hierarchy, making it improbable that ideas 
and the opportunity to leverage unexpected information will emerge in 
the future. If the organization does not value or allow a certain amount of 
experimenting or sloppiness, a discovery may be recast as one that was ra-
tional, leading to potential loss of other discoveries in the future. Finally, 
if the right people do not support the process and notion of serendipitous 
events having possible value, they certainly will go unnoticed. 
ABILITIES NEEDED TO BEABLETO RECOGNIZE AND TAKE 
ADVANTAGE OF SERENDIPITY 
Chance is an event, serendipity is a capability.52 
In "the science of serendipity, luck can be 'caught,' corralled, coached, 
and created."53 For organizational leaders to leverage unexpected infor-
mation, the capability of doing so must exist. This is the arena where edu-
cation, training, and building of skills are most likely and most promising. 
Scientists training students routinely discuss the importance of looking 
for unexpected findings, following paths that peak curiosity and may (or 
may not) have potential payoff.54 In this section, we discuss the broad cat-
egories of skills that individuals need so they may develop the ability to 
notice and take advantage of unsought information or events. The skills 
fall roughly into three broad groupings: general characteristics, those re-
lating to openness and curiosity, and those relating to preparedness and 
alertness, including stage of development. Finally, we close the section 
with a review of the types of obstacles that can thwart the capability of 
serendipity. 
General Characteristics 
The literature suggests that individuals who possess several fundamen-
tal characteristics are more likely to be able to see and pursue serendipi-
tous events. Four broad groups of characteristics or skills come through: 
(1) motivation to work hard and perform well; (2) a social network used 
effectively; (3) willingness to take risks; and (4) a good" grip on reality" in 
terms of what is possible or not in the marketplace. 
First, regardless of the literature discipline-whether education, ca-
reer development, or business-the research focuses on characteristics 
that start with the most basic, including intelligence and competence, a 
strong work ethic, persistence, diligence, and motivation to succeed.55 
Next, the literature suggests that individuals who more often benefit from 
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serendipity have strong and diverse social networks,56 which matches 
with the need for a culture that encourages cross-discipline interactions. 
Third, a willingness to take risks and pursue untested ideas is critical for 
creative ventures of any sort, and particularly with regard to unexpected 
events or information.57 
Finally, and again critical for any endeavor where evaluation of unex-
pected events is necessary, it is an ability to assess "realities." In examin-
ing differences between alert and nonalert people who noticed events in 
the marketplace, Gaglio and Katz58 supported Kirzner's59 alertness prin-
ciple in their findings that "shrewd and wise assessment of the realities" 
helped to encourage flashes of insights, which in turn led to identification 
of market opportunities. Such a grip on reality60 enhances the likelihood 
that an individual will notice (by being alert) and be able to assess the in-
formation or event for its possible value. 
Openness and Curiosity 
As we reported in the commonly told story about the three princes of 
Serendip, one of their foremost qualities was simple curiosity and the abil-
ity to notice.61 They were open to what they found out later were clues to a 
lost camel, which they had no knowledge of at the time they made their ob-
servations along the way. They simply noticed because they were curious.62 
Such openness to unsought events and information has been noted in 
career development, even to the point where Williams et al.63 suggest that 
women are more open to serendipity in their careers than men. In ad-
dition, Van Andel64 includes openness and curiosity as critical factors in 
people who "find" serendipity. Often the curiosity is coupled with a will-
ingness to look for the surprise or the anomaly in a situation.65 Such coun-
terfactual thinking becomes useful later in assessment of the information 
or event as well. 
Preparedness and Alertness 
Was there ever a more trite saying than the often repeated comment 
attributed to Louis Pasteur: "chance favors the prepared mind"66? Yet, if 
this holds, then training, reading, and experience could help foster seren-
dipity. And indeed, one of the most frequently mentioned characteristics 
needed for taking advantage of serendipity is the notion of being ready 
and prepared.67 Kirzner68 defined alertness as being able to notice an event 
without searching for it and in the process identifying opportunities that 
had been overlooked. Cunha et al.69 note that serendipity thrives on alert-
ness and as a result depends upon mindfulness.70 The opposite, an unpre-
pared mind, discards the unusual observation and hence loses the chance 
for leverage.71 
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But simply being alert or prepared may not be enough. In a study of 
corporate executives and new venture managers, Busenitz72 found that 
inexperienced founders of firms were intense and alert in their search 
for information-unexpected and otherwise-but that they were less fo-
cused in how they searched, and sometimes let curiosity take them fur-
ther afield (and wasted time) more than the experienced managers did. 
In other words, they were open, but perhaps not prepared or alert in the 
right manner. 
Closely tied to being prepared and alert is, for some individuals, the 
stage of their own development, whether that is in careers, knowledge 
base, or personal lives.73 For instance, Betsworth and Hansen74 found that 
factors both personal and professional influenced the degree to which, and 
direction that, serendipitous events played in the lives of college gradu-
ates. Gaglio and Katz,75 as we mentioned previously, found that experi-
ence (i.e., later stage of career or profession) factors into the ability of new 
venture founders to notice and take advantage of serendipity. 
Finally, the two medical researchers who noticed the floppy ears in rab-
bits (Lewis and Kellner) were well-established scientists, with solid repu-
tations, and thus at stages of their careers where they could, if they desired, 
be more able or willing to take risks by following a path that could have 
led to nothing. Of course, Lewis did not pursue the anomaly until several 
factors contributed to his being ready to look at the question. He pursued 
the floppy-ears question only later, when he had more resources (rabbits 
to test), when he was frustrated with his other research (which had hit a 
snag, so he was looking for new areas to pursue), and when he was, as he 
put it bluntly, "showing off" a bit to his students. At that point, Thomas 
realized he should be doing a more systematic comparison of injected and 
noninjected rabbits.76 Thus, his stage of career and stage of research proj-
ects influenced his readiness to look into the rabbit ears. 
Obstacles 
As we noted at the start of this section, sometimes "serendipity lost" 
wins the day. Several obstacles can impede serendipity. In fact, one could 
wonder how it ever occurs! The obstacles range from a culture (discussed 
earlier) that neither encourages nor celebrates the ability to notice and take 
advantage of unexpected information, to individual inability or unwilling-
ness to be open, courageous, and timely about what events or information 
might be of value. Barber and Fox's77 comparison of the medical research-
ers identified distraction (with other projects) and lack of resources (not 
enough rabbits to test) as obstacles to Lewis and Kellner pursuing the un-
usual observation when they both first noticed it. 
But perhaps even more important and more devious are the precon-
ceptions, expectations, and convictions that those researchers held, as do 
Serendipity as a Strategic Advantage? 187 
others, when they encountered an unexpected or unsought finding.78 Es-
sentially, once expectations and assumptions are set, it becomes hard to 
see something differently. In the rabbit ears' cases, each scientist had a re-
search focus in an area unrelated to cartilage (which is finally where Lewis 
realized the impact of the enzyme). One focused on proteins, the other on 
muscles, and as a result, when the out-of-the-norm observation occurred, 
and did not fit within their frameworks of how to evaluate it, they could 
not explain it (and refrained from pursuing it any further). Thus, a very 
large obstacle, which ties back to the willingness to be open, is precon-
ceived notions of the meaning of some observation. 
HOW DOES SERENDIPITY HAPPEN? 
How does the act of serendipity occur? What happens when individ-
uals-or organizations-leverage serendipitous information or events? Is 
there a process or framework to help us understand it, follow it, shape it, 
or learn it? 
In this section, we review three frameworks from the business manage-
ment literature (although one comes from information technology) that 
suggest stages or steps in a process of understanding and using serendipi-
tous events or information. Although 50-60 years ago it was not common, 
the science disciplines today, as we have suggested earlier, more readily 
acknowledge that serendipity is a normal part of operations. In contrast, 
Cunha et al.79 note that even now, few management scholars explicitly re-
search serendipity in organizations. 
The frameworks have in common the notions of some sort of precipitat-
ing conditions or situation, whether at the level of the individual,80 the or-
ganization,81 or the external environmental level.82 They also comprise the 
need for an individual to notice an unusual event or anomaly, to recognize 
there might be some possible value, and to connect seemingly disparate ideas 
or data (also known as "connecting the dots"), which some scholars refer 
to as "bisociation."83 This stage refers to the ability to identify "matching 
pairs" of events that are meaningful, and which may be, but are not neces-
sarily, causally related.84 Finally, the frameworks generally include some 
type of evaluation and resulting action that emerges from the process.85 
We describe the three frameworks in more depth further on. 
Looking for A but Finding B 
Mendoca et al.86 and Cunha et al.87 focus on what we might call Type 
II serendipity, where an individual searches for a solution to problem A, 
but in the process, discovers something quite unexpected, a solution for 
a completely different problem B. The framework has four major vari-
ables: (1) precipitating conditions, or those that will encourage or hinder 
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likelihood of serendipity occurring; (2) the process of searching for a solu-
tion to problem A, including how organizational members go about the 
search, and how open and focused they are; (3) bisociation, or the ability 
to connect information, improvise, or make do with what is available to 
solve problems; and (4) reaching an unexpected solution for a different 
problem, including how open the organization and individuals are to am-
biguity and imperfection. 
Stages 
Two other frameworks88 are stage models that focus more on the acts 
of noticing or recognizing an unsought or unexpected event or informa-
tion. Consultants Lawley and Tompkins89 propose a very straightfor-
ward framework that argues for the importance of preparation (E minus 
1), before some unexpected event (E), and the steps that follow (called 
E + 1, E + 2, and so on): recognition, choosing an action, and understand-
ing its consequences. These steps may be iterative and happen repeatedly 
over time before the final evaluation and assessment of the outcome is 
clear. 
A second stage model comes from Gaglio and Katz.90 They focus espe-
cially on the impact of unexpected events in terms of their likelihood to 
lead to moderate or innovative opportunities. They offer a series of steps 
that an individual would experience, where several types of evaluation 
occur. First, an individual determines whether an event is normal and ex-
pected, or unusual and unexpected. For the "normal event," typically the 
individual and organization will continue with its status quo plans and 
operations, and the event then will very likely yield small or imitative 
new opportunities, if any. If the event is unexpected, then a first assess-
ment determines whether to ignore, discount, or pursue it. If the organi-
zation chooses to ignore or discount the event, then the outcome is similar 
to what occurs with a normal, expected event: following the status quo. 
If an unusual event that is noticed and then assessed, subsequent stages 
include trying to understand what it means for the industry, society, or 
market, and then trying to explain it and put into the organization's con-
text. This happens through what Gaglio and Katz91 call "counterfactural 
thinking" and "mental simulation," or trying to sense whether the event 
is analogous to something already experienced. From that analysis may 
come a big breakthrough that would lead to innovative or quite different 
opportunities. 
For all three frameworks, the final outcome or action likewise tends to 
be something that is unexpected or unsought.92 Those could be, for exam-
ple, finding a solution to a different problem, discovering a new solution 
to an existing problem, or identifying a new opportunity (that ultimately 
will save or make money). 
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DEVELOPING A TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR SERENDIPITY 
Our tentative framework for the serendipity process incorporates 
many ideas from existing models and adds a few twists. Some of the 
"twists" emerged from attempts to apply "serendipity as a competitive 
advantage" within a sample business firm. Recently the former CEO of a 
manufacturing firm, Randy Hales, raised the question in his senior man-
agement group of whether the organization could develop serendipity 
as a capability and leverage it to their competitive advantage. The firm, 
Mity-Lite, based in Salt Lake City, Utah, produces high-quality office 
furniture-chairs and tables-for use worldwide. The initial reaction by 
the top executives was, not surprisingly, skepticism. Yet the executive 
suggested that the managers experiment (curiosity and openness!), spend 
30 minutes every two weeks to identify unexpected information, how 
they noticed and evaluated it, and then decide what, if any, actions they 
might take to leverage it. That very small experiment, in addition to exist-
ing research and literature, helped us shape a tentative framework, pre-
sented further on. We begin with a definition and its elements and follow 
with the framework itself. 
Definition 
The definition of serendipity that we use is the ability to recognize and 
evaluate unexpected information and generate unintended value from it. Four 
aspects in the definition are critical to dissect: (1) the ability; (2) to rec-
ognize and evaluate; (3) unexpected information; and (4) generate unin-
tended value. 
Ability 
First, serendipity as a capability more closely mirrors others' definitions 
that it is an alertness or capability to notice what others do not.93 It is not 
a "happy accident" or an unanticipated discovery. Those are data points, 
events, or pieces of information that exist, whether or not they are noticed. 
But data points, facts, or information on their own are worthless without 
the action or ability to leverage them. Thus, our definition of serendipity 
supports others in its focus more on the action taken as a result of observing 
or uncovering information, rather than simply on the discovery or event 
or piece of information itself. 
Recognize and Evaluate 
The ability to recognize and evaluate comprises several pieces. First, rec-
ognizing includes two critical acts: noticing and connecting information. 
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The three princes of Serendip observed or noticed bees circling droplets of 
honey, grass that had been eaten on one side of the road, and three hoof 
prints and one groove in the sand. Those bits of information, noticed and 
filed away then, became important only later, within a context of the prob-
lem of a lost camel. In a sense, the bits of information were "clues" that 
they did not realize were "clues." Only within that context of a problem 
did the princes connect the disparate pieces of unexpected information, 
and put those clues together. 
After noticing or observing comes evaluation of information. The abil-
ity to evaluate encompasses both "flash evaluation" and more systematic 
evaluation in pursuit of creating value. Flash evaluation starts with a "gut 
feel" that moves toward fuller alertness, which in turn can go to a more 
systematic evaluation that confirms the initial gut feel. The reliance on 
information-whether from internal (personal or organizational) or exter-
nal (environmental) sources-may vary, however, and we discuss that in 
more depth further on. 
Unexpected Information 
Serendipity assumes the appearance of some type of information that is 
unanticipated, unexpected, unplanned, or unsought.94 In a sense, it is the 
reverse of what happens during the insight experience. Insight occurs typ-
ically after a conscious search for (and then sometimes and unconscious 
mulling of) information to learn or a problem to solve. During the time we 
wrestle with the problem, or try to learn a new concept, we must assert-
ively put forth effort and work, absorb information and sort it, before the 
insight occurs. Thus, in the case of encouraging insight or aha moments, 
we assertively pursue information. 
Serendipity, on the other hand, begins more passively. It does not neces-
sarily presume any "work" or attempt to solve a problem, other than notic-
ing and having a prepared mind. It can include a search (Type I serendipity 
that we discussed earlier in this chapter), but it does not require it (Types II 
and ill). Rather, it contains the notion of unexpected information appearing, 
even when there is no immediate problem to solve. Information could be 
data, an event, or an observation or clue. Again, to refer to the three princes, 
they came across unsought, unexpected, and unplanned information or 
clues. They made note, but did nothing with the information until they en-
countered a context-problem-which allowed them to connect disparate 
clues or pieces of information into something of (unintended) value. 
Unintended Value 
Finally, the serendipitous experience includes the element of creat-
ing unintended value, which refers to the potential outcome of a problem 
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solution, new opportunity, idea, or other direction that was unintended. 
In other words, serendipity implies the lack of intension to solve a particu-
lar problem or find a particular opportunity. Rather it suggests the ability 
to take unexpected information and create value that, before the informa-
tion appeared, would not have happened. 
Tentative Framework 
The tentative framework (Figure 8.2) offers a process that individuals 
appear to follow as they apply the ability to recognize, evaluate, and cre-
ate value from unexpected information. The model has many steps, but 
we have clustered them into four broad stages, with subparts in some. 
The four stages include: (1) setting the stage or conditions that will in-
crease the likelihood that unexpected information will be noticed (A, B, C, 
and G); (2) noticing unexpected information and beginning to connect it 
to other information (D); (3) evaluating the information-flash evaluation 
and, sometimes, more systematic evaluation-in terms of whether it could 
create unintended value (E); and (4) taking action upon the information to 
generate that value (F). 
Figure 8.2 
Tentative Framework of Serendipity Process 
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Setting the Stage (A, B, C, and ... G) 
The model suggests that conditions at three levels may enhance the 
likelihood of unexpected information being noticed. First, the character-
istics or conditions of an individual (A) that will make her more or less 
likely to notice anomalous information (e.g., openness, confidence, curios-
ity, alertness) are ones that many scholars have covered.95 Organizational 
culture (B), including an openness to new ideas, a cross-discipline mix of 
people, and an allowance for "sloppiness," are similarly ones that research 
has addressed.96 
Finally, external conditions (C) have been less widely considered and 
yet could well be more important for different types of settings or indus-
tries.97 In the case of the Mity-Lite executives, once they agreed to try and 
"track" unexpected information and analyze how they could deal with it, 
the openness in their culture and willingness to notice unexpected infor-
mation was critical for them to generate potential future value. As they 
became assertively alert to unexpected information, they began to see or 
find information that they may have dismissed or not noticed before they 
began their tracking exercise. 
For example, in one case, the executives were launching a new prod-
uct and had market analysis in preparation. In the process, they uncov-
ered unexpected information that suggested their pricing methodology 
was inaccurate. Because they had been alerted to the notion of unexpected 
information and were looking for ways to recognize and leverage what-
ever they might find, they did notice unexpected information about their 
pricing methodology, and evaluated and acted upon it. In the discussion 
about their experience, they claimed that because they had been alerted to 
the notion of unexpected information, they were more receptive to notic-
ing and otherwise might have missed it without those "conditions" being 
favorable to noticing. 
Interestingly, even when information is seen to be of "no value," the 
simple act of noticing and recognizing possibilities may in tum enhance 
the openness for setting the stage for future noticing (G). Thus, the act of 
noticing and considering and then doing a flash evaluation may heighten 
awareness and increase alertness for more unexpected information later. 
Noticing and "Connecting" Unexpected Information (D) 
The process of noticing or being alert to unexpected information98 and 
then beginning to connect or "bisociate"99 unexpected bits of information 
is one of the most critical steps in the serendipity process and framework. 
Gaglio and Katz100 call this the "What's going on?" step, which involves 
noticing an unusual piece of information and then beginning to wonder 
(and follow through) what it might mean. Critical in this phase, of course, 
is the willingness to pursue the anomaly.101 
Serendipity as a Strategic Advantage? 193 
The Mity-Lite executive team offered several examples of unexpected 
information that they connected that led to new directions, some more 
strategic than others. One example involved a former employee who had 
left the firm to gain expertise in a very different area than his previous 
job. He joined another organization and realized he missed working at 
the manufacturing firm; so he contacted the head of operations saying 
that he would like to return to the firm, and was willing to go back to his 
former job. Simultaneously, the operations executive had been consider-
ing the question of how to help the firm develop and move into the very 
expertise arena that the former employee had developed while he was 
away from the firm. The executive had decided that he had no option but 
to develop an internal candidate since finding an external candidate was 
deemed likely to be too difficult and costly. Then, boom! Unexpected in-
formation (the former employee with the desired expertise) calls. His re-
emergence thus solved a problem from an unexpected direction (Type I 
serendipity). 
Evaluating-Flash and Systematic (E) 
The evaluation stages comprise both flash evaluation and more system-
atic evaluation. 
Flash Evaluation. Initially, and coupled with the early connecting of 
information bits is a flash evaluation, in which an individual does a quick, 
almost gut feel assessment of the unusual information. The manufactur-
ing executives refer to this as using their "experienced eyes" to assess 
quickly some unexpected information. That initial gut feel then may lead 
the individual to become more alert to whether there are ways to connect 
the observed information to other already known information, both inter-
nal and external. 
More Systematic Evaluation. A more systematic evaluation would in-
clude analytical assessment that leads toward a clearer confirmation of 
the information's possible value. That process of assessing unexpected in-
formation for potential value is affected by factors such as risk tolerance, 
level of uncertainty surrounding the information and evaluation, timing, 
and finding additional information that will help confirm or dispute the 
initial unexpected information. Depending upon how evaluators/deci-
sion makers take those factors into account when assessing unexpected 
information may lead to better or worse outcomes. 
The systematic evaluation part of the model has three critical elements: 
(1) the distance between perceived or anticipated opportunity from the un-
expected information and the reliability of the evaluation of the unexpected 
information (in the middle), (2) the general evaluation process from "gut 
feel" to a firmer belief about the evaluation, and (3) the factors that may 
influence the process of evaluation. Those elements also determine the 
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extent to which the information used in making decisions is weighted in-
ternally or externally. 
The result of evaluation could take on at least three outcomes or deci-
sions of whether to pursue an opportunity. First, when the unexpected in-
formation is evaluated in the context of both internal and external factors, 
when the evaluator/decision makers are not "swayed" too strongly by 
any of those sources, the evaluation is "balanced" and the outcome may 
well be an opportunity that the decision maker leverages when competi-
tors do not. 
In the second situation, the decision maker notices unexpected infor-
mation but mostly because others point it out and suggest that there is a 
way to leverage it. The decision maker then essentially follows the herd 
to try and take advantage of the unusual information, resulting in what 
might be called a "herd" outcome. In this case, there is no competitive ad-
vantage to the organization because a herd of organizations is trying to 
leverage the information. 
Finally, internal decision makers may be pressured from sources, such 
as government policy makers (e.g., Vietnam's Ministry of Finance or the 
U.S. Treasury during the financial crisis) to act. In this case, the organiza-
tion may act on unexpected information without thoroughly considering 
external factors or repercussions. During the 2008 financial crisis, for ex-
ample, large U.S. banks were forced to take sell toxic assets to the U.S. gov-
ernment, which affected their leverage ratios; most ultimately and quickly 
repaid the money. Unexpected information, evaluated "for them," and the 
outcome was not necessarily in their favor. This "do it my way" approach 
is less common but does exist. 
Creating Unintended Value (F) 
The ability to recognize and evaluate unexpected information is not 
valuable in itself. To be a competitive advantage, the assessment must 
yield value and action: the unintended value is thus a critical part of the 
process. Whether it results in solving an existing or not-yet-tackled prob-
lem, finding an opportunity, or generating new ideas for future use, the 
use of serendipity (as an ability) must be that individuals and the orga-
nization as a whole can leverage it to create value. The manufacturing 
firm executives, for example, realized that by responding to a request for 
just one sample product, they ended up with an "unexpected customer" 
that could become major part of the firm's business. Since the orders (and 
revenue) were not anticipated in the current fiscal year plan, the firm has 
decided to incur premium labor (overtime) to fill the demand, with the ex-
pectation later of increasing the price point for the products. Unexpected 
information/ request created an initial problem (finding a way to fill or-
ders), but ultimately became an opportunity. 
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WHAT NEXT? 
The reaction of managers to the idea of "watching for" serendipity has 
been mixed-most say they understand the concept immediately, once 
they move beyond initial skepticism or even outright laughter ("how can 
you use something so unpredictable?"). Others say, "of course, it happens 
all the time." Some have embraced the idea of actively being open to ser-
endipity and looking for ways to use it. As we mentioned, one firm's se-
nior executives who began to track unexpected information and notice 
how, if at all, it could take advantage of it, found at least six cases of "ser-
endipity gained" during their first two months of looking for it. As they 
described the incidents, it became clear that they experienced what they 
referred to as different types (i.e., people and process based), but they also 
experienced all three forms of serendipity: Type I (looking for a solution to 
A but finding a solution from an unexpected source); Type II (looking for a 
solution to problem A but discovering something completely unexpected 
that, in turn, led to an opportunity and solution to an, as yet, unidentified 
problem); and Type III (finding something unexpected and unsought that 
later turned into an idea for an improved product). Although the execu-
tives did not categorize the events as being "different types of serendip-
ity," they recognized the value of noticing and being aware of unexpected 
information, whereas they had not before their CEO presented the idea to 
them. As they have begun to calculate the economic impact, their skepti-
cism about the rather fuzzy notion has dissipated. 
This small example of the application and use of serendipity, or the 
ability to notice, evaluate, and create value from unexpected information, 
is a first step for both managers and scholars to learn more about it. As or-
ganizations seek new ways to improve performance, and as the existing 
techniques (e.g., lean manufacturing) become widespread, firms will look 
for avenues that are less tapped and more difficult to execute well, such 
as using creativity and innovation, insight, and serendipity. Being an early 
tester, if not an early adapter, may help some of them move into the lead. 
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